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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST ONE BANK, UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 930476-CA
vs.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
VIRGINIA,
Defendant/Appellant.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellant/ Life Insurance Company of Virginia
("LOV"), petitions for rehearing on the Opinion issued by the
Court on December 21, 1994. This petition is brought under
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Counsel for

the petitioner certifies that the petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
The Court has incorrectly decided the issues. The
Court's error is in characterizing the appellant's conduct as a
setoff.

All of its analysis and the erroneous conclusion derive

from that seminal error.
The Court's error is apparent from inconsistencies in
the Opinion itself.

In its recitation of facts on page 2, the

Court acknowledges that the arrangement for LOV to apply UUI's
commissions was consensual and intentional, and it was made as
consideration for LOV's advance of funds to UUI.1 This
undisputed fact is again noted in footnote 5 on page 8 of the
Opinion.

LOV applied the commissions as a result of "a second

assignment in favor of Life of Virginia."

Id*

These facts are

*What the Court characterizes in its Opinion as "a second
assignment in favor of Life of Virginia" is an explicit instruction
by UUI to apply ongoing commissions for the repayment of LOV's
advance:
"Assignor hereby authorizes and directs the Life
Insurance Company of Virginia to credit said commission [sic]
against the balance of the Assignor's obligation to the Life
Insurance Company of Virginia by virtue of the Note dated March 1,
1989 made by the Assignor and held by the Life Insurance Company of
Virginia." Record at 00093. This authorization is dated March 2,
1989. It is an integral part of the agreement between for LOV's
advance to UUI. It is not an alternative source of repayment
arranged after the advance or as a consequence of any failure by
UUI to make payments from some other, originally contemplated
source. (R. at 00093)
2

incompatible with the conclusion that LOV exercised a unilateral
setoff.
The Court is obviously aware of the law of setoff which
it announced in Mark VII Financial Consultants Corp. v. Smedley,
792 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1990) and cited on page 4 of the
Opinion. A setoff is a counterclaim which arises from a separate
or unrelated transaction.

Id. at 132.

Smedley does suggest that

the distinction between setoff and recoupment is not significant
for purposes of civil procedure (i.e., for determining mandatory
and permissive counterclaims under Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure).

But Smedley does not abandon setoff as a discrete

principle of law.

Unfortunately, the present Opinion does, and

it does so sub silentio.
The Opinion seems to rely on a perception that LOV is
trying to subordinate or trump West One's interest, and because
LOV has shown no defect in that properly perfected interest, LOV
must necessarily fail. (See Opinion at page 2-3)

This

characterization of LOV's position is incorrect, and it has
skewed the Court's analysis.

LOV does not contest that West

One's interest in the insurance policy commissions was perfected
prior to the assignment from UUI to LOV.
rights are not unlimited.

However, West One's

No one, including West One, has ever

even suggested that.
3

It is a given that West One's rights are limited by the
terms of its own security documents.

U.C.A. Section 78-9-201;

and Insley Manufacturing Corp* v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d
1341, 1345 (Utah 1986).

And yet, West One has never satisfied

the basic requirements of its own contract.2
It is also fundamental that UUI had the right to "use,
commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral" until West
One acted on its perfected security interest by directing the
account debtor (LOV) to pay the commissions directly to West One.
U.C.A. Section 78-9-205. The Court acknowledged this right when
the issue was addressed in oral argument.

Yet, nowhere does the

Court's Opinion explain why that right somehow disappears when

2

West One's security agreement is contained in the document
entitled Assignment of Contract as Collateral. Paragraph 7a. of
that document says: "Upon or at any time after default [by UUI] .
. . [West One may] make demand and sue for all rents, income,
commission and profits under the Contracts. . . . "
Record at
00088. Under this term, West One must wait for a default by UUI
and then make demand for LOV to pay over commissions before LOV is
obligated to do anything other than follow UUI's direction.
Section 7a. of the security agreement continues: "Assignor
(UUI) is further authorized to direct the Companies (i.e., LOV)
under any Contracts hereafter entered into by Assignor, on receipt
of written notice from Assignee (i.e., West One), to pay to
Assignee all rents, income, issue and profits accruing under the
Contracts. . . . " Here again, West One's interest is limited by
its own document which requires direction to the contract debtor
(LOV) to make payment directly to West One before any obligation to
do so arises.
Except to the extent its June 19,1992 Complaint can be couched
as the requisite notice to pay over commissions, West One has still
not exercised its contractual and statutory rights correctly.
4

the source of the commissions happens to coincide with a
destination for them which is intentionally and volitionally
designated by UUI.
Finally, it is undisputed that LOV, as the account
debtor on the commissions, had the right to follow UUI's
direction as to the payment of the commissions until it received
notification from West One that "the amount due or to become due
has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the
assignee."

U.C.A. Section 78-9-318(3).

Neither West One nor UUI

ever gave notice to LOV to pay commissions to West One.3

LOV's

right, even its obligation, to follow UUI's direction for the
"use, commingling, or disposal" of the commissions is thus
statutorily protected.
This is the statutory scheme of intermingled rights
under the Uniform Commercial Code.

It is also the express term

of the security agreement between UUI and West One, and the
express term in the notification given by West One to LOV.

The

Court's Opinion reads the fundamental protections of Sections 9205 and 9-318(3) right out of the Uniform Commercial Code in the
3

West One's Notice of Assignment to LOV specifically recites
that "upon written notice from Continental Bank & Trust Company
[i.e., West One's predecessor in interest], all monies due or to
become due under the Contract described above are to be paid to The
Continental Bank & Trust Company pursuant to this Assignment."
Record at 00042. This is explicitly not a current direction to pay
commissions directly to West One's predecessor.
5

context of assigned accounts.

It also inexplicably enhances West

One's rights over those which are allowed by statute and reserved
in West One's own documents.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relies on several
cases which involve true setoffs of non-mutual debts in nonconsensual circumstances.

For instance, Insley Manufacturing

Corp. involves a bank which covered overdraft checks without
contemplation or consideration of the source of repayment.
Later, when unrelated funds which were restricted proceeds of
collateral came through its account, it unilaterally applied
those funds to the overdrafts.

In essence, the bank executed on

someone elses collateral.
The contrast between those circumstances and the
present case is fundamental.

Here, LOV only made the advance to

UUI in contemplation of and with the direction by UUI that the
source of repayment would be the commissions.

Certainly, LOV was

on notice that the commissions were subject to the perfected
security interest of West One.
security interest,
One's priority.

And if West One had acted on its

LOV would have been required to bow to West

However, UUI had the right to make the

assignment to LOV and LOV had the right to follow or accept the
assignment until West One declared a default and demanded payment
over to itself.

West One never made the requisite demand.
6

The Court also relied on In re Apex Oil Co.P 975 F.2d
1365 (8th Cir. 1992).

But the Court's own recitation of the Apex

facts shows that in that case the assignor's (ARTOC) invoices
were stamped not only with notice of the secured creditor's
interest but also with a

present direction that payments be made

to the secured creditor's lock box.

This is a critical

distinction from the facts of the present case.

The same pivotal

distinction is also found in Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v.
United Airlines. Inc.. 122 B.R. 871, 875 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1991).

CONCLUSION
Obviously, LOV would like the Court's Opinion corrected
because the result is unfavorable to it. But in addition, the
Opinion should be changed because it undermines the carefully
balanced rights of creditors and debtors under the Uniform
Commercial Code.

Furthermore, it implicitly and unnecessarily

broadens the concept of setoff, with unknown mischief to be
reaped in the future.

Finally, because of the internal

inconsistencies in the Opinion, it is simply bad jurisprudence.
The Opinion strains to reach a result which is not necessary and

7

not justified by the statutes, by West One's documents, or by any
overriding equities.
JL
6~TdaY

DATED t h i s

o f

January, 1995,
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

PTT^KT.T,

Q^ttXptCVZ

Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on t h i s

following:

ffil

day of

/hlAUutyf

, 1995, to the

/
Carolyn Montgomery
James H. Woodall
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
2 01 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

38999

8

